Retailer-driven agricultural restructuring - Australia, the UK and Norway in comparison by Richards, Carol et al.
This is the author’s version of a work that was submitted/accepted for pub-
lication in the following source:
Richards, Carol, Bjorkhaug, Hilde, Lawrence, Geoffrey, & Hickman, Emmy
(2013) Retailer-driven agricultural restructuring - Australia, the UK and
Norway in comparison. Agriculture and Human Values, 30(2), pp. 235-
245.
This file was downloaded from: http://eprints.qut.edu.au/68211/
c© Copyright 2013 Springer Verlag
The final publication is available at Springer via
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10460-012-9408-4
Notice: Changes introduced as a result of publishing processes such as
copy-editing and formatting may not be reflected in this document. For a
definitive version of this work, please refer to the published source:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10460-012-9408-4
1 
 
Retailer-driven agricultural restructuring—Australia, the UK 
and Norway in comparison 
 
Carol Richards • Hilde Bjørkhaug • 
Geoffrey Lawrence • Emmy Hickman 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Farmers, as producers of raw commodities ‘upstream’ in the supply chain, are vulnerable to the 
oligopolistic market power held by major supermarket chains whose market share has increased 
considerably with the expansion and consolidation of global food retailing (Brown and Sander 
2007; Burch and Lawrence 2005; Fuchs, Kalfagianni and Arentsen 2009). This concentration of 
food retail has consequences for actors along the food supply chain as supermarkets are not only 
able to exert exceptional buying power (Konefal, Bain, Mascarenhas and Busch 2007) but also to 
transfer this market power into other forms of power, including regulatory power (see Clapp and 
Fuchs 2009). Supermarkets are trending toward by-passing wholesalers in favour of direct 
contracts with farmers and, given their market power, this also means that supermarkets are able 
to impose their own terms on suppliers. These ‘terms’ are referred to here as forms of private 
regulation. Private regulation differs from many government-based regulations in that they are 
‘voluntary’ (Fulponi 2006). However, suppliers are compelled to comply with private forms of 
regulation if they want to access key food markets. When markets such as food retail are heavily 
concentrated into oligopolies, farmers often find themselves in what the British former Prime 
Minister, Tony Blair, referred to as an ‘armlock’ (Freidberg 2004, p. 521). That is, when a small 
number of corporate retailers control the majority of food sales, suppliers have little option but to 
enter into business relationships with them. 
Supermarket, or ‘proprietor’, regulation is generally expressed in the form of private 
standards. Private standards embrace a suite of criteria that relates to the size, colour, shape, 
production, packaging, and handling of food products as well as food safety, or ‘credence’ 
claims such as those relating to fair trade and animal welfare. The standards relating to food 
safety are often more stringent than public standards set by government bodies dealing with food 
safety (Narrod, Roy and Okello 2008). Private standards also vary in form. They may be set by a 
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particular supermarket chain, for example, Woolworths Quality Assurance in Australia, or by 
retailers’ organizations, such as the British Retail Consortium (originating in the UK, but used 
widely elsewhere). Other schemes, such as GlobalGAP, transcend the traditional regulatory 
parameters of the nation state, attending to food governance as it is traded globally beyond 
national jurisdictions (Brunori and Guarino 2010).  
While private regulation is intended to institute a more robust food safety system, the 
proliferation of private standards holds a number of disadvantages at the farm level. In particular, 
farmers have raised concerns that they are subject to excessive regulatory burden and financial 
costs in complying with numerous public and private standards. A small-scale producer may find 
the costs associated with compliance to a number of different proprietor standards onerous, 
ultimately excluding them from access to markets. Biénabe et al. (2007) argue that the higher 
capital requirements related to private standards can lead to the exclusion of small- and medium-
scale producers, despite the comparative advantage they offer as specialised, locally integrated, 
labour (rather than capital) intensive farmers.  
It has been noted that due to their growing control of the agri-food system, major 
supermarket chains are able to lower their transaction costs by passing them along the chain 
through such practices as slotting fees (for shelf space), delayed payments, and proscribed 
infrastructure development at the farm or processing level (see Burch and Lawrence 2005; 
Trimmer 2008). As minor players in the food production system, small-scale family farmers are 
engaged in unequal relationships with the supermarkets and are less able to carry the costs 
associated with supplying low-volume produce to these retailers. 
Given the increasing necessity of economies of scale under modern agri-food systems – 
we explore the experiences of small-scale farmers (those largely dependent upon family labour 
for farm and off-farm income) and their ability to maintain a place in the production of food 
under these emerging governance structures. The power of supermarkets has been reported to 
drive farm-gate prices down, further entrenching the ‘price-taker’ status of farmers. Yet, at the 
same time, costs to consumers have risen inexorably (Lawrence 2008). While farms operating on 
larger scale may have the capacity to absorb these costs, small-scale farm producers are 
particularly vulnerable, and, as Konefal et al. (2005) note, struggle to maintain a financially-
viable business.  
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In this paper, we argue that the increasing market power of supermarkets, particularly in 
relation to their governing of the food supply chain via private standards, leads to a new form of 
farm restructuring where small-scale producers are forced out of key markets, and potentially, 
out of business. The empirical basis for this research is qualitative data co-constructed through 
semi-structured interviews with key agents working in the food supply chain in Australia, 
Norway and the United Kingdom. These interviews aligned with various funded research 
projects being undertaken by the authors. Those interviewed in relation to this study include 
personnel from the major supermarket chains, farmers’ associations, regulators, food standards 
organizations, consumer organizations and food and farming-related NGOs. We also draw upon 
secondary data, such as the submissions to commissions of inquiry into grocery retail in 
Australia (Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 2008), the United Kingdom 
(Competition Commission 2000) and Norway (NOU 2011). While it is recognised that the rise of 
private food assurance standards is transforming the livelihoods of small-scale farmers in 
developing nations (Narrod, Roy and Okello 2008), the focus of this paper is the less-explored 
impact on farmers in these three advanced capitalist societies. 
 
 
Supermarket power and private regulation in the 21st Century 
 
Over the past few decades, supermarkets have increased their retail power and are now the key 
players in the global food-retail sector (Burch and Lawrence 2005, 2007). The five biggest US 
supermarkets (Safeway, Albertson’s, Kroger, Ahold and Wal-mart) doubled their market share 
from 19 percent of sales in 1992 to 42 percent in the year 2000 (Konefal et al. 2005: 296). A 
similar trend of food retail market concentration is reported in the UK with four retailers (Tesco, 
Asda, Sainsbury and Morrisons) controlling 75 percent of food sales (Lang, Barling and Caraher 
2009). In Norway, almost all groceries are sold through four food retail chains: Norgesgruppen, 
Ica Norge, Coop Norge and Rema1000 (OECD 2004). The Australian food retail sector is 
similar, with Coles, Woolworths and the wholesaler, Metway (supplying smaller retailers such as 
the Independent Grocers Association [IGA]), holding a combined market share of around 70 
percent (ACCC 2008, p. 39). This exceptional concentration of food retail, and the resultant 
market power of major retailers, has become cause for concern for both producers and 
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consumers worldwide, leading to a proliferation of commissions of inquiry, major reviews and 
investigations into supermarket power and anti-competitive behaviour. These have recently 
occurred in many jurisdictions, including Australia, England, the European Union, Ireland, 
Norway, Russia and Romania. In some instances, these inquiries have led to a re-regulation of 
the sector. Norway and the UK are considering installing an Ombudsman to oversee 
supplier/supermarket relations, and in Australia, the consumer advocacy group, Choice, has 
joined the Australian Food and Grocery Council to recommend the creation of a new 
supermarket industry ombudsman for Australia (Choice/Australian Food and Grocery Council 
2011).  
In Australia in 2008, an Inquiry into the Competitiveness of Retail Prices for Standard 
Groceries by the Australia Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) called for 
submissions from interested parties, which were made public via the ACCC website. The 
majority of submissions from farmer organizations complained about the exercise of market 
power of the major supermarket chains. For instance, in their submission to the inquiry, 
Horticulture Australia Ltd (see ACCC 2008) stated: 
 
As the retail market share of the MSCs [major supermarket chains] has increased, 
agricultural producers have become more heavily dependent on trading with the MSCs 
for their livelihoods. This dependence has provided the MSCs with significant bargaining 
power over agricultural producers which in turn has enabled the MSCs to set the terms 
and conditions of trade heavily in their favour. 
 
 While market share is intrinsically linked to economic power a broader conceptualization 
of power is necessary to understand just how supermarkets govern others. Clapp and Fuchs 
(2009, p. 7) recognise instrumental, structural and discursive dimensions of power that are 
influential in relationships between corporate, and other, actors. Instrumental power refers to the 
direct influence of one actor over another. This includes resources that enable direct power 
through access to such things as finance and organizational capital. Discursive power brings a 
cultural dimension, where powerful actors ‘frame’ issues into categories by linking them to 
norms and values which also raise legitimacy issues for corporate actors (see Richards, Lawrence 
and Burch 2011). While both instrumental and discursive forms of power are vital to the capital 
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growth of major corporations, it is structural power that provides an understanding of how 
supermarket chains exert their influence beyond their own corporate structure and into the supply 
chain through the control of resources and networks (Clapp and Fuchs 2009).  
The international governance of the food system is, according to Clapp and Fuchs (2009), 
necessary to protect society from the negative social, economic and environmental consequences 
of a globalised food system. While such protection was once the realm of the state, neoliberal 
reforms have enabled the market to ‘self-govern’ (see Campbell and Le Heron 2007). For 
instance, following a number of food scares including bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE - 
also known as Mad Cow Disease) the British government placed the onus on retailers through a 
‘due diligence’ clause of the Food Safety Act 1990, to ensure the foods they were selling were 
safe (Fulponi 2006). With increased market power, supermarkets now govern not only in relation 
to food safety, but also on a number of other criteria such as the cosmetic appearance of fruit and 
vegetables, animal welfare, land management practices, agricultural inputs and food safety 
criteria that exceed the requirements of government. This privatization of food governance has 
ramifications for society as a whole, yet it does not carry the hallmarks of democratic 
governance. Civil society does not elect corporations to rule. Rather, their mandate is derived 
through a neoliberalization of regulation and uneven market relationships, which further serve to 
consolidate their power. 
With major supermarket chains involved in food governance, the regulation of food has 
become an increasingly complex activity. While there is evidence of a shift from ‘government to 
governance’ in food regulation, the government itself still has a role to play in standards setting. 
Food producers, processors, manufacturers and retailers must abide by the national laws 
regarding the safety and handling of foods. In Australia, the legislative framework for food 
safety is administered by Food Standards Australian and New Zealand, also known as FSANZ, 
which, in turn, compiles the national Food Standards Code which is interpreted and implemented 
at the State level. In the United Kingdom, the Food Standards Agency plays a similar role, and in 
Norway, Mattilsynet oversees food safety across the nation. 
In addition to these minimum food standards set by nation-state jurisdictions, private 
sector standards also need to be met by food producers and processors. Across the three case 
study nations of the UK, Norway and Australia, there is complicated mix of public baseline 
standards, private standards that match government baseline standards but carry a quality 
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assurance brand, and higher-level standards that exceed the Government’s requirements. There is 
also an array of standards that certify ‘credence’ claims against an assortment of criteria relating 
to fair trade, organic, sustainable farming and animal welfare. In Australia, for example, a farmer 
supplying fruit to the two major supermarkets will require certification against Woolworths’ 
Quality Assurance scheme and the British Retail Consortium’s standards which is required by 
Coles. If the same growers were also to export produce to Europe (the majority of food grown in 
Australia is exported), then farmers would need to be audited against the proprietor standards of 
international supermarket chains, and/or the meta-standards of GlobalGAP – a set of standards 
owned by a number of major food retail companies. Free range, fair trade and organic produce 
will need to meet additional sets of criteria.  
This lack of harmonization of private standards increases farmers’ regulatory burden and 
impacts unfavourably on farming costs (Konefal et al. 2005). The costs of the third party 
auditing (which polices this system of quality assurance) is borne by producers, something which 
farmers consider to be an additional financial burden for an industry where financial returns are 
already low. Farmers have been required to invest in specialised equipment and technology to 
fulfil the requirements of buyers and their systems of compliance (Konefal et al. 2005; 
McCullogh, Pingali, Stamoulis 2008). Importantly, meeting the criteria of private standards does 
not necessarily bring a premium to farmers. Rather, it merely allows access to markets (see Kirk-
Wilson 2002). For large-scale producers, access to national supermarket chains are more likely 
to outweigh the economic costs associated with certifying produce due to economies of scale 
(Fuchs, Kalfagianni and Arentsen 2009).  
The harmonization of standards is often seen as the Holy Grail for suppliers. In an ideal 
situation, suppliers would need to comply with only one set of criteria to meet all government 
and proprietor-based standards. Indeed, there have been attempts at harmonising quality 
assurance schemes. The Red Tractor scheme in the UK represents a harmonization effort for 
British produce. A similar scheme, Nyt Norge (Enjoy Norway), operates in Norway. Such private 
standards are often described as being ‘whole of chain’ owned. Other efforts in harmonization 
include the Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI). GFSI is a supermarket-owned umbrella body 
that oversees a number of private standards, including those of the British Retail Consortium 
(BRC), Safe Quality Food (SQF) Dutch HACCP (Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points), 
and International Food Standard (IFS). Schemes such as GlobalGAP also aim to harmonise 
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standards. GlobalGap is designed to operate globally, but is used mostly to monitor food 
standards of produce grown in the developing world that is exported to Europe. Modified forms 
of GlobalGAP have also appeared, such as JapGAP and USGAP. According to SGS (2010), a 
global benchmarking and certification company, major supermarket chains such as Wal-Mart, 
Carrefour, Tesco and Ahold have agreed to accept any of the four benchmarked schemes in order 
to reduce duplication. Despite this, there is evidence that supermarkets apply their own private 
standards to differentiate their ‘own brand’ products from others – as a basis for securing greater 
market share (Campbell and Le Heron 2007). For example: 
 
Nurture was launched in 1992, to ensure Tesco delivers world class quality fruit and 
vegetables for our customers. It is an exclusive, independently accredited, quality 
standard that assures you, our customer, that Tesco fruit and vegetables are grown in an 
environmental and responsible way. Each grower is independently audited and monitored 
regularly to ensure we continue to meet the exacting standard (Tesco 2011). 
 
 Compliance to bronze, silver and gold Nurture standards is overseen by a private firm, 
CMI Plc which, on behalf of Tesco, registers suppliers and oversees the certification process. 
Clearly, such schemes do not sit within a broader harmonization ethos and present another set of 
criteria of which suppliers must satisfy to access major markets such as the one held by Tesco – 
which controls approximately 31% of the UK food retail market (Hall 2010). We argue that 
private regulation is a catalyst toward a new era of agricultural ‘adjustment’, where small-scale 
farm operators are still confronted with the decision to either ‘get big, or get out’. This structural 
shift is sponsored by major food retailers who are increasingly controlling and directing the food 
supply chain.  
 
 
Case studies: Evidence of the impact of private regulation on small-scale producers  
 
The following section draws on actors’ voices to demonstrate the control that supermarkets have 
on the supply chain and the impact that this has on small-scale farmers. Face to face interviews 
were conducted with key actors along the food supply chain in the three case study countries. 
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Secondary data have also been utilised where appropriate. Interview participants were assured 
confidentiality, and as such, names, or identifying particulars, have been omitted, although 
evidence that is available in the public domain, such as submissions to the ACCC, are referenced 
in full. 
 
 
Australia 
 
The Australian fieldwork occurred in 2009, less than a year after the release of the Australia 
Competition and Consumer Commission’s (ACCC) report entitled Inquiry into the 
Competitiveness of Retail Prices for Groceries. As noted earlier, Australian food retail is 
characterised by two major supermarket chains, Coles, Woolworths, and one wholesaler, 
Metway, which control around 70 percent of the entire market (ACCC 2008). A mix of data from 
our own interviews, and secondary data from the public submissions made by individual farmers 
and farmers’ organizations to the ACCC, were considered in analysing the impact of private 
standards on small-scale farmers in Australia.  
During the interviews, participants raised concerns about the amount of duplicate 
auditing that is occurring in the food industry. In particular, it became clear that the power of the 
major supermarket chains meant that it was the suppliers who had to bear the cost of compliance 
to numerous private standards. A representative of a national supermarket chain described the 
process of accreditation: 
 
Suppliers go through third party accreditation so they’ll get a skill-gap analysis so 
somebody will come in and go “there’s your current standard, that’s what you get to, 
there’s your gap”. You pick up your gap, you then meet the requirement - and they’ve got 
to do that through an auditing process. That’s where the suppliers get a bit narky because 
they say they will get multiple audits on the supplier which is cost-prohibitive to them. 
 
Multiple audits, often measuring the same thing but for different markets, were viewed as a 
regulatory burden that was passed down the supply chain by powerful supermarket chains to less 
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powerful producers. One food regulator who worked within a hybrid structure of public and 
private food governance in Australia observed the following:  
 
There’s very significant market shifts with the supermarkets. The two big supermarket 
chains [Woolworths and Coles], but also the independent chain have, in the past 10 years 
increased their demands for food safety and quality, their demands for HACCP systems, 
pushed back the costs of production, and the costs of inappropriate production, such as 
recall costs, back through their systems, so that the producers are bearing more and more 
of those costs. 
 
Some of those interviewed articulated the value of quality fresh-food products but recognised 
that the cost burden was onerous. A business representative of a fruit company made the 
following observation: 
 
 …the consumer wants better product so this is a double-edged sword. I mean, looking 
for a better product is a good thing, you know it’s a good thing to aspire to, if you see 
what I mean, but the standardization has a big impact on producers’ margins.  
 
Apple and Pear Australia was among a number of members of the farming and horticultural 
industries that complained to the ACCC about supermarkets’ regulatory power: 
 
Some growers/producers argue that the duopoly power exerted by the two major 
supermarket chains … unfairly effects their viability by demanding higher and higher 
compliance standards in respect to quality (which include size, shape and colour 
specifications which in turn limits available produce) …The pressures inevitably cost the 
grower who has a very limited ability to pass on costs to wholesalers or retailers. 
 
A counter argument from a major retail chain was that it is in the best interests of farmers to bear 
the costs of auditing to achieve certification and recoup costs through greater profits by accessing 
major markets. However, there is a scale imperative in making such gains: 
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With a commercial agreement, yes, there is increased auditing but you have increased 
sales. You should have increased sales due to that - so there is an argument there. 
Depending on the size of the supplier, if he has a 14,000 chicken flock he’s not going to 
enter into a commercial agreement with a Coles or a Woolworths because he could not 
supply [an adequate volume] to that retailer. He just doesn’t have that size and then he 
couldn’t afford the cost of the auditing as well. 
 
 This statement supports the argument that smaller-scale farmers, even those who can 
produce 14,000 chickens, do not possess the ‘economies of scale’ to enter into commercial 
relations with the two largest supermarket chains in Australia. In this instance, the supermarket 
spokesperson argues that it is not regulatory burden that excludes such farmers, but a ‘scale 
mismatch’ (see McCullogh, Pingali and Stamoulis 2008).  
While, logically, many small-scale producers cannot meet the volume of products 
required to enter into commercial supply agreements with the major supermarkets, there is also 
evidence that larger-scale producers and consolidators are also being squeezed on economic 
terms before the costs of private standard compliance are factored in. A spokesperson for an 
independent grocers’ organization stated: 
 
I have no doubt that Woolworths actually mean this sincerely, when they go back to the 
dairy industry and say, “look we’re about sustainable farming …. we don’t want to see 
suppliers dry up”. And I think their senior management would actually believe that. But 
the [Woolworths’ representative] who buys their house-brand milk, his charter in life is to 
buy the cheapest milk in Australia. He couldn’t care if 156 farmers went broke tomorrow, 
provided he got the cheapest milk. And what sort of career move is it for him to go back 
to his boss and say, “oh by the way, we decided to pay 10 per cent more for our house 
brand tomorrow”. “Oh great, we’ll give you a promotion!” 
 
These findings resonate with the theoretical insights of Clapp and Fuchs (2009) who 
highlight how economic power can often convert into structural power - in this instance, the 
power to govern. In such scenarios, economic and regulatory power becomes blurred and 
mutually reinforcing.  
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The United Kingdom 
 
Food retail in the UK is also heavily concentrated, with the top four major supermarket chains 
controlling around 75 percent of food retail sales (Lang, Barling and Caraher 2009). According 
to Harvey (2007), UK food retailers have the highest level of home brand sales of any country, 
as well as the largest volume of chilled ready-meals, which are mostly sold under home-brand 
labels.  
Based on face-to-face interviews conducted in the UK with industry officials, union 
representatives and members of quality assurance schemes, and secondary data from farmers’ 
submissions and testimonies in competition inquiries, evidence indicates that small-scale farmers 
experience a significant private audit burden. Many farmers reported that their biggest and most 
immediate concern was (cartel-like) economic buying power, pushing prices to below 
productions costs, often through the ‘middle agents’ such as processors, abattoirs and marketers. 
Many of those interviewed believed the latter to be culpable, with some preferring to have direct 
contract with the supermarkets (which was interpreted by farmers as being reserved for the best-
of-the-best). 
Concerns were also raised about the level of market dominance enjoyed by major 
retailers and the audit burden this creates for farmers wishing to supply their produce to 
supermarkets. As a result of the shift from public to private proprietor regulation of the UK food 
chain, supermarkets have developed sector-wide, collective, quality assurance schemes designed 
to “strengthen their structural power and induce supplier participation” (Fuchs, Kalfagianni, and 
Arentsen 2009, p. 35). Although proprietor schemes such as Assured Food Standards’ Red 
Tractor label are voluntary, major retailers in the UK will often reject produce that is not 
certified under such schemes. According to one interviewee, supermarket control of food 
regulation means that unless farmers invest in quality certification, they are denied access to 
major retail markets: 
 
The major retailers will not take in product unless it’s assured through the chain 
because there are due diligence requirements under the … Food Safety Act and they 
12 
 
use an assurance scheme to fulfil their due diligence requirements. So, if you are a 
farmer down here and you’re not assured, you won’t get your food product into a 
major food retailer (Supply chain regulatory body). 
 
Another remarked: 
 
So you know you end up with this specification and you’re in the hands of the retailer 
… the consequences of losing business then become sort of so great that you almost 
have to do whatever the supermarket says (primary producer peak body). 
 
 
 Farmers have little choice but to comply with proprietor standards. In the case of the UK, 
small-scale farmers have reported that this can be financially crippling, since they must cover the 
costs of certification and auditing for proprietor schemes. For example, a European Commission 
(EC) enquiry into the Red Tractor scheme revealed that in terms of the most burdensome aspects 
of quality assurance scheme membership, medium and small-scale producers ranked “annual 
audit costs together with record keeping as quite significant” (Garcia 2007, p. 24). This 
demonstrates that smallholders with unfavourable economies of scale are often ill-equipped to 
meet the costly and time-consuming demands of many assurance schemes.  
It is also the case that farmers are struggling to bear the expense of multiple audits if they 
are certified under more than one assurance scheme. In a questionnaire for the 2000 Competition 
Commission inquiry, one farmer responded: 
 
Where different multiple stores have differing standards in relation to training, 
hygiene, working methods and quality assurance, this adds to the cost of producing 
goods and causes more difficulty. 
 
 A dairy farmer articulated how s/he had no choice but to comply with the assurance 
schemes set down by the major retailers, and had no option to bear the cost, despite a perception 
that they did not accrue any personal benefits: 
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We farm well, within the restrictions of the extremely overbearing and parasite breeding 
farm assurance schemes, legislation which has been largely forced upon us at the whim 
of the major retailers, at high cost and also zero advantage to us as producers (UK dairy 
farmer). 
 
Similarly, a pig farmer states how Tesco’s private standards on animal welfare have impacted 
upon his business:  
 
We have been left uncompetitive partly by the process of [animal] welfare reform which 
was started by Tesco a decade ago in the form of their Malton Code which was the 
precursor to our Quality Assurance…However, quality assurance pork quickly became 
the standard and we are having to compete again on the commodity market against less 
high welfare producers from other countries (pig farmer supplying Tesco ‘finest range’ 
home brand). 
 
This problem of a multiple audit burden on small-scale farmers has also been acknowledged by 
regulators themselves: 
 
It’s been recognised that although a high level of inspection and checks against 
compliance with legislation might be seen as a good thing because it means that you 
know all food’s supposed to be safe and complies with various standards, it’s very 
onerous for the farmers if they’re continuing to get them, particularly if they’re getting 
inspections by more than one [buyer] coming in (representative from the government’s 
regulatory body). 
 
 There have been attempts to harmonise the multiplicity of quality assurance schemes to 
minimise the burden on farmers and to create a degree of uniformity across food standards. 
GlobalGAP, for example, is a meta-governance scheme comprised of suppliers, retailers and 
other agri-food associates, and aims to standardise food safety standards by setting benchmark 
requirements endorsed by all of the major retailers in the UK (Konefal, Mascarenhas and 
Hatanaka 2005, p. 197). But despite acting as an umbrella scheme to ensure that supermarkets’ 
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food safety standards are consistent, GlobalGAP has not prevented supermarkets from 
implementing their own additional quality assurance schemes (such as Tesco Nurture – as 
mentioned above) that exceed the requirements stipulated by GlobalGAP. According to a 
farming union official in the UK this signifies ‘regulatory creep’ “… which is where you see 
particularly executive agencies going beyond their stated objectives. There’s quite a lot of that 
going on” (Peak farming body). 
It appears that harmonization schemes designed to reduce the regulatory burden on small-
scale farmers have not been effective. One regulator noted that supermarkets still have the 
ultimate power as food authorities despite efforts to reduce multiple auditing: 
 
It’s not possible to stop individual retailers who want to promote their brand in a 
particular way having certain ‘bolt-ons’. They may have some extra standards that 
they want, or for instance, they may want to use Freedom Foods
1
 (Supply chain 
regulatory body).
 
 
 
 This reflects the dynamic of a highly concentrated retail market in which supermarkets 
use quality certification in an attempt to gain a competitive edge through market differentiation, 
while passing the costs of additional regulation down the supply chain to farmers.  
Arguably, however, there are some benefits for farmers who do participate in quality 
assurance schemes. While it has been acknowledged that the initial economic and administrative 
costs of being certified and audited can be burdensome, regulation is sometimes reduced for 
farmers who have demonstrated a high level of compliance with certain schemes. A consumer 
advocacy representative interviewed in the UK in 2010 explained that farmers can enjoy a degree 
of ‘earned autonomy’ if they achieve good audit results: 
I think it makes sense that if you have got somebody who is obviously performing 
consistently well, they signed up to assurance schemes, they’ve got their own kind of 
independent quality control people coming in and auditing it, then it doesn’t make 
                                                          
1
 Freedom Food is an RSPCA monitored assurance scheme stipulating additional welfare standards for animals in the UK food industry 
(Freedom Food 2010). 
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sense that they’re getting the same level of inspection as somebody who isn’t 
bothering with any of that (consumer advocacy organization). 
 
 However, the difficulties faced by smallholder farmers trying to comply with quality 
assurance schemes may present too much of a barrier for them to earn such autonomy. Hutter 
and Amodu (2008, p. 6) argue that the onus is placed on businesses (farmers) to self-regulate and 
ensure that they can meet assurance scheme standards. But, as in the case for Australia, self-
regulation “is most suited to large, well-informed and well-resourced companies and crucially it 
is also reliant on the readiness of companies to self-regulate” (Hutter and Amodu 2008, p. 7).  
 
 
Norway  
 
While the food retail is heavily concentrated in Norway, with four major retail chains controlling 
around 99 percent of food retail (Fuchs, Kalfagianni and Arentsen 2009), at the time of writing 
the supermarkets did not have farmers in an ‘armlock’. There are two main reasons for this. First, 
while the retail sector is heavily concentrated, so too is the farmer co-operative domestic supply 
format. This brings about greater bargaining strength for farmers who sell into farmer-owned co-
operatives and, as such, they are not as vulnerable as UK and Australian farmers who have 
reported that the supermarkets trade them off against each other in a ‘race to the bottom’ on price 
(see Fox and Vorley 2004). Norway’s co-operative system appears to offer a buffer to individual, 
small-scale farmers and protects them from one-on-one contracts with major corporate food 
retailers.  
Second, Norway does not have a strong, supermarket-driven, system of private regulation 
as found in both Australia and the UK. While there is a new mechanism for food governance 
emerging in Norway, as outlined below, the Government has a strong and central role in 
assessing credence and other claims made by food producers. Government could sometimes 
reduce in house controls if a third party was doing the same but:  
 
That’s not formal. So it’s not set that if you have in-house or third party control we 
are stepping back (government food regulator).  
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 A representative from a large certification company reported that major supermarket 
chains do, in some instances, require British Retail Consortium certification when sourcing some 
high-risk products from companies. They suggested that market-based incentives, rather than 
regulation, were a more common system. This approach employs enticement rather than 
policing, and occurs at mid-points of the supply chain: 
 
Before, the milk quality was really bad, so they said okay we’re sick of this you can 
actually do something about it. So they started saying if you have good milk you get 
a lot more money than if you have bad milk. It changed overnight. And I think that’s 
a lot of what they do. They’re trying to do that now with cows when they’re being 
delivered for slaughter. If they’re dirty you get less money than if they’re clean.  
 
During the interview, the same respondent was asked about the role of the private sector in 
conducting food inspections, instead of the government, as is the case now: 
 
[laughs]… I mean, they’re so used to the government dealing with this – and they’re 
still giving out such huge subsidies that I don’t even think they’ve thought about the 
private sector going out and doing these things. The government’s done it for so long 
so there’s a mindset, isn’t there? 
 
 Norwegian certification companies are building up their competence on food certification 
and practice abroad while waiting for the Norwegian food industry and retail sector to institute 
this private system in Norway. 
This general thinking presents an interesting juxtaposition with Australia and the UK, as 
all three countries have an oligopolistic food retail format. Yet, at present, there is little evidence 
to suggest this market concentration translates into the market power exercised through private 
regulation to the extent witnessed in both Australia and the UK. In fact, the key quality mark 
KSL Matmerk (Quality Systems in Farming - Food Mark) is a government-owned standard that 
incorporates quality criteria based on environment, animal welfare and human health and safety. 
More recently, a ‘whole of chain’ quality assurance scheme, Nyt Norge (Enjoy Norway) was 
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introduced to promote Norwegian-produced foods. The rules of the brand was developed jointly 
by the food sector and the government, this represents a step away from government-only 
intervention, but the certification systems underpinning the system are not based on proprietor 
standards, or certified through the private sector as is the case with its British equivalent scheme, 
Red Tractor. The KSL Matmerk is the standard used in the Nyt Norge scheme, and represents 
government baseline standards, rather than proprietor-owned ‘bolt on’ quality standards. 
Although supermarkets might require compliance with this standard from their suppliers, 
this is qualitatively different from the imposition of a plethora of supermarket-owned standards, 
verified through an army of auditors with costs passed to the lowest feasible rung in the food 
chain. As was noted earlier, these are often geared toward product differentiation which sits in 
opposition to harmonised standards which the government aims for.  
There are a number of reasons Norway differs in its approach to food standards. As a 
social democracy, Norway has not moved too far down the neoliberal policy track. Further, 
unlike Britain, Norway has not been subject to food or agriculture-born scandals like BSE and 
foot-and-mouth disease. This is an important point as it has a bearing on the degree to which the 
food system is regulated. At present, Mattilsynet, the food safety authority, is responsible for all 
legislation relating to the production and distribution of food in Norway. This includes business 
activities within primary production, food industries, grocery stores, food catering – along with 
imports of animals, food and plants. Norwegians are generally very happy with the quality and 
safety of Norwegian food. With Norway having a reputation as a trusting nation (Kjærnes et al. 
2007) some 85 percent of Norwegian consumers consider the government-owned food safety 
authority to be the most reliable source of information regarding food safety (The Norwegian 
Food Safety Authority 2009). The issue of consumer trust and confidence in food has become 
one of the major factors for the stability of the European food sector (see Fritz and Fischer 2007; 
Kjærnes et al. 2007) and European consumers react differently to food quality and safety 
communication strategies according to their home country and its cultural influence (Romano 
2005, in Fritz and Fischer 2007).  
This situation may change soon in Norway with a rise in the availability and sales of 
supermarket ‘home brands’. Vertical integration of supermarkets is exerting pressure on farmers 
to break free of the co-operative system and channel their products through alternative supply 
arrangements. During the latter decade, vegetable, fruit and berries were taken out of the market 
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regulation system, as was poultry. Since then, private companies have increased their market 
share and contract directly with farmers. The transition to home brands is a significant one that 
may ultimately impact on small-scale farming (that is, the majority of farmers in Norway) as 
supermarkets by-pass farmer-owned ‘known brands’. Branding products with the house label 
does bring a greater risk to the retailer (Burch and Lawrence 2005; Burch and Lawrence 2007). 
If the product is associated with a food scare, both the product and the supermarket which owns 
the label can be rejected by consumers, an important reason why the UK and Australian 
supermarkets have embraced more stringent food standard requirements than are required by 
government.  
Since the financial crisis of 2008, Norway’s supermarket chains have focussed their 
efforts on building their home-brand credentials. The four major retailers have different 
strategies, but common to most of them is that they want stronger control over the goods they 
sell. For example, Rema1000 are working for a full vertical integration the food chain on meat, 
egg and poultry and dairy categories and are in opposition to the strong position of the supply 
cooperatives. Also common to all four retailers is that they build long-term, strategic, 
arrangements with suppliers. Both British and Norwegian supermarkets have come under 
scrutiny for receiving direct payments for stocking and placing particular suppliers’ brands. The 
Norwegian Competition Authority is constantly monitoring the situation. In fact, an extended 
court case in Norway has examined claims that the farmers’ cooperative TINE made payments to 
supermarkets to reduce competitors’ opportunities (Konkurransetilsynet 2009). The competition 
authority lost the case.   
While the exercise of market power on farmers through supermarket-led private 
regulation did not emerge from the data in the Norwegian case study, the Norwegian government 
does hold concerns about competition in the food supply chain. In February 2010, a public 
commission was instigated to inquire into the power relations in the food supply chain. In his 
opening speech at the launch of the inquiry Minister of Agriculture and Food, Lars Peder Brekk 
stated: 
 
Increased ownership and influence by retailers is a relatively new phenomenon that we so 
far have not analysed in depth. We wish to cast light on the consequences of this 
development for consumption and production. It is also important to go through the entire 
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food supply chain in order to get a clear picture of the power relations (Ministry of 
Agriculture and Food Newsletter 2010).  
 The Federation of Norwegian Commercial and Service Enterprises (HSH)
2
 hired the 
Norwegian Agricultural Economics Research Institute to write a report on the status and 
development of Norwegian retail (Kjuus 2010). The report concluded that the massive 
restructuring of retail into four major chains during the 1980s and the 1990s had increased 
efficiency, created more categories of stores and increased food variety and availability. The 
Commission did, however, conclude that despite the strong position of the supply cooperative, 
retailers were exercising increased power in the food chain. The concentration of buyers into 
four major supermarkets have made it more difficult for small and speciality producers to access 
the shelves of the stores.  
In sum, while there is a significant degree of instrumental power, in the case of Norway 
this has not been converted into the structural power to govern food quality beyond the retailers’ 
own corporate boundaries. What the research in Norway reveals is an increase in supermarket 
own brand products and changes in the power dynamics between food retailers and farmers 
cooperatives. While the market share is concentrated among four major retailers, their upstream 
power is still weak in major food categories because of the strong position of the agricultural 
cooperatives (Harvey 2007, p. 66). 
 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
It is difficult to quantify the extent to which small-scale farmers in the western world are being 
structured out of the farming industry as the result of a more highly-concentrated retail sector, 
including the procurement activities of, and private standards set by, these firms. Clearly, there 
are differences in the ideological positions and policy settings of various nations and regions in 
regard to agriculture and food. For instance, Norway is a country that opted not to join the 
European Union largely due to its desire for autonomy in regard to rural and agricultural policies. 
                                                          
2
 HSH is Norway’s leading federation of commercial and service enterprises within the private sector. The four 
major retailers are members of HSH.  
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However, in both Norway and European Union member countries, agriculture is protected 
through government support such as subsidies, and is not subject to the full brunt of market 
forces, as is the case for Australia.  
Layered underneath and intersecting with these differing political settings are local 
cultures and geographical constraints, including land use, land tenure systems, and various 
farming cultures. It may not always be the case that small-scale farmers are squeezed out of the 
industry. As McCullogh, Pingali and Stamoulis (2008, p.31) observe, “…where smallholders are 
part of a dualistic system with the presence of large landholders, modern buyers show a 
preference for procuring from large farmers”. However, they note that small-scale farmers can be 
contracted by retailers when there is no one else from whom to buy, or for public relations 
purposes (which tend to be temporary and short-lived). They use the term ‘scale mismatch’ to 
describe constraints to small-holders engaging in modern agri-food systems, which include 
supermarkets as the chains most powerful actors. It is the case that “an increasingly consolidated 
retail sector is dealing with an increasingly consolidated network of suppliers” (Konefal et al. 
2005, p. 298).  
Given the industrialised and global nature of modern agrifood systems, small-scale 
farmers are generally not in a position to negotiate for a favourable price from other actors along 
the supply chain that might offset the cost of compliance with private standards. It may not be in 
the buyers’ interests to deal with farms that are considered to have a low output that does not 
match the scale of mega-supermarkets which carry various lines of produce across their national, 
and often global, operations: 
 
Smallholder farms can be excluded from preferred supplier lists or contract-based 
marketing channels because buyers specify a minimum cut-off acreage or product 
volume that exceeds their capacity, given finite land holdings. It is much more likely, 
though, that smallholders will be excluded de facto because of fixed costs involved with 
participating in modern chains (McCullogh, Pingali and Stamoulis 2008, p. 33). 
 
 Similarly, Konefal et al. (2005) argue that the development of food retail oligopolies has 
restructured agri-food production from a large number of small suppliers, to a small number of 
large suppliers. Clearly there are a number of elements of supermarket power that impact upon 
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the current and future viability of family or small-scale farms as costs are passed along the 
supply chain from powerful corporate actors to under-resourced rural producers. We support the 
assessment of Konefal et al. (2005) who identify a turn to quality certification as both a response 
to food scandals such as Mad Cow’s Disease, and as a form of market differentiation. Our 
findings show that the associated system of private quality assurance standards is an additional 
form of power that is exercised over producers not merely through economic power, but through 
emerging gains in structural power (Clapp and Fuchs 2009). 
We have presented evidence that suggests that the future for small-scale farmers is bleak 
across a significant proportion of the western world at least, particularly while the food retailer 
sector further concentrates its oligopolistic power, reducing the number of alternative food 
outlets available to receive produce from farmers. This can be considered a form of agricultural 
restructuring. However, unlike previous government-based schemes to assist small-scale 
producers to leave farming, today’s ‘agricultural adjustment’ is driven by an unelected corporate 
retail sector. Countries which still have more organised and powerful farmer bodies, such as 
Norway, are able to deflect the brunt of supermarket power to some degree, especially where 
farmer-owned co-operatives also approach monopolistic market power to match that of the 
retailers. However, in many industrialised countries, although farmers may be politically 
organised they undertake farming as a highly individualistic activity, and as such, have shown 
themselves to be ‘easy pickings’ for the cost-cutting business practices that have been associated 
with corporate food retailers. 
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